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The Power of Warm Glow
Usha Rodrigues
Professor Brian Galle’s Keep Charity Charitable1 is a thoughtful
contribution to the ongoing conversation about the proper tax treatment of
charitable organizations. I largely agree with Galle’s arguments, but I would
like to offer two criticisms of his positions: first, Galle overstates the problem
posed by for-profit firms offering charitable services; and second, he
understates the power of “warm glow” in the nonprofit organization.
Galle responds chiefly to a provocative 2007 essay by Anup Malani and
Eric Posner, who suggested that for-profit firms that engage in charitable
work should be taxed like their nonprofit charitable equivalents, Section
501(c)(3) organizations.2 They argue that if a for-profit organization
dedicates itself to charitable work, it should not pay federal taxes on its
income, and any contributions made to the for-profit should be tax deductible
to the donor.3
Alluring, isn’t it? All Malani and Posner are saying is: Give for-profits
a chance.4 If for-profits do the same good work nonprofits do, they should be
taxed equally.5 On the face of things, that seems only fair. As pie-in-the-sky
thought experiments go, it’s a beauty.
Enter Professor Galle, who sets out to make mincemeat of the
Malani–Posnerian pie.
Galle argues that “society perceiv[ing] an
organization as charitable is a critical element of the entity’s success.”6 This

1. 88 TEXAS L. REV. 1213 (2010).
2. Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for Non-profit Charities, 93 VA. L. REV. 2017
(2007).
3. Id. at 2025–27.
4. Id. at 2065.
5. Id. at 2023.
6. Galle, supra note 1, at 1215.
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observation is spot-on, although I will suggest a little later that Galle does not
develop it quite as far as he can.
Let me first, however, offer a few
observations about Galle’s other criticisms of the Malani–Posner proposal.
Like almost everyone, Malani and Posner take Henry Hansmann’s elegant
contract-failure theory as a starting point for analyzing nonprofits.7 In his
seminal work The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, Hansmann argued that the
nonprofit form’s nondistribution constraint—its hallmark—arises because of
the gap between the donor to a charity and the beneficiary of that charity.8
For example, say that you are trying to help recent earthquake victims, and
you discover an organization named “Help to Haiti” that purports to be able
to feed and house these individuals. Your problem as a donor is that you
can’t directly ask the Haitians you’ve tried to help though this organization if
your money actually went to them or was instead siphoned off by the
managers of Help to Haiti.9 But, as Hansmann’s story goes, if that
intermediary is bound by the nondistribution constraint, and thus has no
owners because it is constitutively prohibited from taking profits, at least you
have some comfort that your donation will really aid the needy Haitians you
mean to assist.
Cold comfort, say Malani and Posner. They point out that a for-profit
firm can achieve by contract the same assurance that is provided by the
structural nondistribution constraint imposed on nonprofits by law.10 All the
private firm need do, according to Malani and Posner, is to agree with donors
not to distribute profits in excess of a specified amount and then hire a
professional monitor to police the contractual arrangement.11 Indeed, in the
universe envisioned by Malani and Posner, use of for-profit charities will be
better for donors because the profit motive will discipline for-profit firm
managers to operate efficiently so that donations will be used in the most
cost-effective and productive ways.12 Galle answers, quite rightly, that
credible monitoring is costly, and monitoring costs currently borne by the
public at large would fall disproportionately on small charities.13
While Galle’s responses to Malani and Posner are in general well
reasoned, in two respects they seem to me to fall short. My first concern
stems from Galle’s discussion of “mixed firms,” that is, firms that engage in
both charitable and noncharitable work.14 The principle espoused by Malani
and Posner logically extends to these firms. Thus, for example, when
7. Malani & Posner, supra note 2, at 2035 & n.33.
8. Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838, 848 (1980).
9. Of course, consumer-protection laws, like false advertising, also now help protect against this
type of fraud but were less developed when the nonprofit form arose.
10. Malani & Posner, supra note 2, at 2035.
11. Id. at 2035–36.
12. Id. at 2022.
13. Galle, supra note 1, at 1219.
14. Id.
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Starbucks sells “Fair Trade Coffee” or Delta Airlines offers carbon credits
for a ticket purchase, corporations should receive the same tax benefit as do
nonprofit entities.15 Galle objects that sorting a firm’s noncharitable work
from its for-profit work would be unduly burdensome in the “mixed-firm”
world.16 I worry, however, that on this point Galle has overplayed his hand.
The need for costly third-party monitoring, after all, seems far less important
for firms such as Starbucks or Delta Airlines than for the archetypal case of a
start-up for-profit charity. Starbucks and Delta enjoy valuable brands. As a
result, the marginal return to them of skimping or cheating in their charitable
enterprises would not be worth the loss of reputational capital they would
suffer if they were exposed as exploiting farmers for a profit or knowingly
lining their pockets instead of decreasing emissions. In contrast, start-up
entities, with less of a name to lose, would be much more in need of the
services of a costly professional outside monitor. This point may grow in
significance given the recent surge in for-profit mixed-charitable activities.
My second concern focuses on Galle’s treatment of “warm glow,” a
specific kind of utility that comes from giving. The threat of agency costs—
that is, the threat that the firm’s managers are shirking, stealing, or otherwise
not serving their principal’s interests—lurks in every organizational form,
from general partnership to corporation to nonprofit. Malani and Posner
argue that for-profits offer lowered agency costs because nonprofit managers
may more aggressively rent seek or slack on the job.17 In contrast, if working
at a nonprofit offered the possibility of a profit, and the attendant increase in
wages a healthy profit promises, then more talented managers focused on
delivering the best services would seek employment in the for-profit
charitable-business sector.18
Galle is unconvinced. He says that many employees are motivated to
work for charitable entities precisely because “peers will know that the
employee is making a sacrifice.”19
And this drive to warm-glow
compensation reduces costs unrelated to the charitable mission. Put another
way, nonprofit managers are “true believers” who are less likely to rent seek
or tolerate inflated administration costs because such behavior is
incompatible with the “mission” they have chosen to make their own work.20
Thus, warm glow functions as a strong form of norm, policing agency costs

15. Malani & Posner, supra note 2, at 2062–63.
16. See Galle, supra note 1, at 1220 (explaining how mixing charitable and noncharitable
enterprises in the same firm would require the IRS to identify charitable functions with much more
specificity than it does today).
17. See Malani & Posner, supra note 2, at 2055–56 (asserting that competition amongst
nonprofits is at such an insufficient level that managers will act to improve the performance of the
nonprofit only when it is threatened with insolvency).
18. Id. at 2056.
19. Galle, supra note 1, at 1223.
20. Id. at 1224.
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not through custom but through constitution in a way that naturally
suppresses behavior that is incompatible with the organization’s purpose.21
By this logic, flying first-class on a humanitarian mission would be
incoherent.22 Thus, locating the charitable enterprise within a for-profit
organization—as Malani and Posner would have us do—irreparably
cheapens it, “undermin[ing] the benefits of warm glow for everyone.”23 Any
gain in talent is more than offset by the heightened costs of monitoring and,
even more, by the destruction of the warm glow.
Galle’s assessment of warm glow’s benefits is persuasive, but I would
suggest that it is incomplete because it focuses only on employees. Just as
employee’s warm glow is dimmed by participating in a for-profit charity, so
too is a donor’s warm glow diminished.24 Imagine that the individual who
wants to help the Haitian homeless can choose between two organizations.
One is a nonprofit. The other, a for-profit, contracts that it will pay 80 cents
on the dollar to the Haitians and further contracts with
PricewaterhouseCoopers to monitor its results. The understanding is that the
entrepreneur will pocket 20% of all donations, minus administrative costs.
From the donor’s perspective, one clear danger is that the for-profit
would skimp on quality outputs to decrease administrative costs.25 But there
is an even deeper problem—the very knowledge of the profit making by the
owners of the charity dims the donor’s warm glow.26 The difficulty is that
the transaction is no longer about caring individuals coming together to help
suffering Haitians. It is instead about forming an uneasy alliance between
altruistic donors and entrepreneurs bent on making a buck. Knowledge of
the economics of the transaction, the ultimate profit motive of the for-profit
charity entrepreneur, the risk of contract failure, and the inability to measure
desired outputs combine inexorably to produce the suspicion that the donor is
really just a sucker.
In short, there is something very special about charitable warm glow.
For example, a local nonprofit food cooperative is selling more than the freerange eggs or organic strawberries that Whole Foods and other for-profits
market so effectively. The co-op offers community participation and an
investment in local farms, a distinctive ethos that is incompatible with the

21. Id. at 1224–25.
22. Naturally the reader can think of charities rife with clear rent seeking—United Way springs
to mind. But agency costs are present in firms of every organizational stripe, from partnership to
for-profit corporation. The point is that agency costs are less prominent in nonprofits than one
might expect because of warm-glow mechanism.
23. Galle, supra note 1, at 1224.
24. Indeed, Galle himself suggests this point by observing that individuals can derive warm
glow from participating in charity, and that may be a significant motivation behind giving. But
Galle’s focus is on the incentives of a charity’s employees, not its potential donors.
25. Galle, supra note 1, at 1228.
26. Id. at 1224–25.
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profit motive and closely connected to the construction of an individual’s
social identity. I explore the special nature of the nonprofit more fully, and
link it to the psychological concept of social identity, in a separate work—
Entity and Identity—forthcoming in the Emory Law Journal. 27 This sense
of social identity is separate and apart from the warm glow that giving to a
charitable nonprofit creates. Yet by generating both of these important
values, the nonprofit form imparts something that the for-profit form cannot.
The implication of this idea may be surprising: Malani and Posner’s
suggestion of equal taxation of for-profit and nonprofit charitable activities
may not disadvantage nonprofits much at all. Even in a tax-neutral world, at
least some nonprofits would continue to flourish because they offer a special
kind of warm glow that for-profits cannot provide, the warm glow of
participating in a nonprofit organization.
Brian Galle’s article makes an important contribution to the nonprofit
debate by revealing subtle difficulties in the approach taken by Malani and
Posner. I agree with Galle that the nonprofit charities cannot be reduced to
their tax-exempt status. Still, his discussion of mixed-firm charitable activity
seems overly alarmist, given the realities of mixed-firm charitable work. His
view of warm glow focuses on employees at the cost of assessing the power
of warm-glow effects on all participants of a nonprofit charity. These
differences aside, I look forward to continuing—both with Galle and
others—the larger conversation about the role of nonprofits in our society.

27. Usha Rodrigues, Entity and Identity, 59 EMORY L. J. (forthcoming 2010).

